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Abstract
With the increasing development of handheld devices, Loca-
tion Based Services (LBSs) became very popular in facilitat-
ing users’ daily life with a broad range of applications (e.g.
traffic monitoring, geo-located search, geo-gaming). How-
ever, several studies have shown that the collected mobility
data may reveal sensitive information about end-users such
as their home and workplaces, their gender, political, reli-
gious or sexual preferences. To overcome these threats, many
Location Privacy Protection Mechanisms (LPPMs) were pro-
posed in the literature. While the existing LPPMs try to pro-
tect most of the users in mobility datasets, there is usually a
subset of users who are not protected by any of the existing
LPPMs. By analogy to medical research, there are orphan
diseases, for which the medical community is still looking
for a remedy. In this paper, we presentMooD, a fine-grained
multi-LPPM user-centric solution whose main objective is to
find a treatment to mobile users’ orphan disease by protect-
ing them from re-identification attacks. Our experiments are
conducted on four real world datasets. The results show that
MooD outperforms its competitors, and the amount of user
mobility data it is able to protect is in the range between
97.5% to 100% on the various datasets.
CCS Concepts • Security and privacy→ Pseudonymity,
anonymity and untraceability.
Keywords Mobility Data, User Re-identification, Location
Privacy ProtectionMechanism, User-Centric Protection, Data
Privacy
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1 Introduction
Nowadays, the proliferation of mobile devices embedding
GPS chips (e.g. smartphones, tablets, smartwatches) has sig-
nificantly contributed to the development of geolocated ser-
vices, also named Location Based Services (LBSs). These
services are useful for users’ daily life as they allow them
to localize nearby friends, discover their environment and
request for places whenever they like and wherever they are.
The downside is that huge amounts of information regard-
ing users’ locations are being gathered and stored by third
party services. These services or other entities that may have
access to the collected data (e.g., accidentally or through an
attack) may exploit it fraudulently in order to infer and reveal
sensitive information about individuals (e.g., home address,
workplace, religious beliefs, sexual preferences, political ori-
entations, social relationships). The most common threats
include: (1) re-identification attacks where an anonymous
mobility trace is re-associated to its originating user based
on previously recorded data [11] [16] [33], (2) mobility pre-
diction where users’ next moves are anticipated [29] [15] [3],
(3) extraction of user’s Points of Interest (POI) (e.g., home,
workplace, etc.) [35] and (4) inference of social relationships
(e.g., friends, coworkers, etc.) [6] [32].
To tackle these threats, many Location Privacy Protection
Mechanisms (LPPMs) were proposed in the literature. LPPMs
protect user location information by relying on awide variety
of techniques such as perturbation, generalization and fake
data generation [17].
To evaluate the effectiveness of LPPMs, a variety of pri-
vacy metrics are usually used and the resilience against re-
identification attacks is one of them. Considering a protected
mobility trace (i.e., a raw trace to which a given LPPM is
applied), a re-identification attack tries to link the protected
mobility trace to its owner based on past unprotected mobil-
ity data that the attacker has access to. The more an LPPM
is able to protect against re-identification attacks, the bet-
ter. There exist a variety of re-identification attacks in the
state-of-the-art literature that differ in the way they model
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and analyse user mobility (e.g., PIT-attack [16] uses Mobil-
ity Markov Chains and AP-attack [22] uses heatmaps to
model users’ mobility). However, when LPPMs are evaluated
against re-identification attacks the focus is generally put on
the protection of the crowd, i.e., protecting the larger propor-
tion of users possible, and little attention is given to users
that remain unprotected. Considering a set of state-of-the-art
attacks and LPPMs at the disposal of a data security expert
aiming at the protection of a given dataset, the question that
the latter may ask is:What should be done with mobility traces
that are subject to re-identification despite the use of LPPMs?. A
straightforward, and safe solution that the expert may adopt
is to delete these vulnerable mobility traces from the pro-
tected dataset. However, this solution would engender the
loss of large data portions. To assess this loss, we performed
an experiment in which we applied three state-of-the-art
LPPMs to protect four mobility datasets.
On the protected datasets, we ran three state-of-the-art
re-identification attacks and we removed from the protected
dataset, the traces that were re-identified by at least one of
the attacks. The results of this experiment with Geo-I [4],
TRL 18 andHMC [23] (described further in Section 4.1.2 and 5)
show a data loss of 42% on average and that can reach 95%
in the most vulnerable dataset. The detailed results of this
experiment are presented in the problem illustration (Sec-
tion 2.4).
In this paper, we present MooD (MObility Data Privacy
as Orphan Disease), a user centric approach to enforce lo-
cation privacy using multiple LPPMs aiming at the pro-
tection of orphan users, i.e, users that are not protected
against re-identification attacks while using any of the ex-
isting LPPMs. The originality of MooD is that it combines
off-the-shelf LPPMs and applies a fine-grained protection.
The LPPMs’ combination is realized with the application
of various LPPMs on the same trace in the form of func-
tion composition, while the fine-grained protection implies
the application of various LPPMs on contiguous sub-traces.
MooD’s mechanisms are driven by the resilience to state-of-
the-art re-identification attacks and the data utility metrics
set by the data security expert.
We evaluateMooD by applying it to four real life mobility
datasets and comparing its performance to the application
of individual and hybrid LPPMs [22]. The results of our ex-
periments show thatMooD is able to protect users’ data in
a range between 97.5% and 100% on the four datasets while
the best competitor (HybridLPPM) protects users’ data in a
range between 64% and 95% on the same datasets.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First,
we present in Section 2 a background on user re-identification
attacks and location privacy protection mechanisms and we
illustrate the handled problem. Then, we describe the design
principles of our system in section 3. Further, in section 4,
we proceed to the experimental evaluation of our solution.
Finally, we present the related work and conclude in section
5 and 6 respectively.
2 Background and Problem Statement
In this section, we describe mobility traces, re-identification
attacks and LPPMs (Section 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, respectively).
Then we present an experiment we did to illustrate our prob-
lem (Section 2.4).
2.1 Mobility Traces
A mobility trace is a sequence of spatio-temporal records
r = (lat, lnд, t ) associated to a given user, where lat and lnд
correspond to the latitude and the longitude of GPS coordi-
nates while t is a timestamp. To simplify mobility traces are
timeseries (i.e.,T ∈ (R2 × R+)∗).
2.2 User Re-identification Attacks
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Figure 1.Models of mobility profiles
A user re-identification attack aims at associating a pro-
tected mobility trace to its originating user based on users’
past mobility. Two phases are necessary to run these at-
tacks: a training phase and an attack phase. In the training
phase, the attacker collects non-obfuscated mobility history
of known users from several sources and builds users’ mobil-
ity profiles. Several models have been used in the literature
to characterize mobility profiles of users. The most com-
mon models include Points of Interests (POIs) (i.e., the set of
meaningful places where users spent time), Mobility Markov
Chain (MMC) where states are POIs and edges represent
the probability transition between states or HeatMaps that
aggregate user mobility over time across cells. Figure 1 illus-
trates the above three models. Then, in the attack phase, the
attacker that receives an anonymous mobility trace, tries to
re-associate it to the closest user profile among the learned
ones.
More formally, considering an anonymous mobility trace
T , a set of pastmobility traces of known usersH = {H1,H2, . . .}
whereHi ∈ (R2×R+)∗ and a set of usersU , a re-identification
attack A is defined in Equation 1.
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A : (R2 × R+)∗ → U
T 7→ A(T ,H) = ua (1)
2.3 Location Privacy Protection Mechanisms
In order to mitigate location privacy threats, Location Pri-
vacy Protection Mechanisms (LPPMs) have been introduced
in the literature. LPPMs operate modifications on raw mo-
bility data in order to offer end-users a set of privacy guar-
antees. More formally, a protection mechanism L is defined
in Equation 2, it takes as input a mobility trace T and a set
of parameters Υ and produces an obfuscated version of the
mobility trace as an output.
L : (R2 × R+)∗ → (R2 × R+)∗
T 7→ L(Υ,T ) = T ′ (2)
LPPMs differ in the way they alter the original mobility
data and in the guarantees they offer to end-users. These
guarantees can be theoretical (e.g., k-anonymity [31], differ-
ential privacy [12]) or practical (e.g., the resilience to known
attacks).
2.4 Problem Illustration
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Figure 2. Ratio of non-protected users with state-of-the-art
LPPMs and Hybrid LPPM on four real datasets
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Figure 3. Ratio of Data Loss with state-of-the-art LPPMs
and Hybrid LPPM on four real datasets
Consider a data security expert that has to protect a given
mobility dataset before its publication. The security expert
has access to a set of LPPMs and a set of user re-identification
attacks found in the literature. In order to assess the effec-
tiveness of the LPPMs in front of the attacks, the expert
may decide to run the re-identification attacks on the pro-
tected dataset and choose the LPPM that better protects her
original dataset. We performed such an experiment on four
real mobility datasets protected using three state-of-the-art
LPPMs (i.e., Geo-I 4, TRL [18] and HMC [23]) and a hybrid
solution proposed in [22] on which we ran three state-of-
the-art attacks (i.e., POI-Attack [27], PIT-Attack [16] and
AP-Attack [22] ). The details of the used LPPMs and attacks
are presented in Section 4. The results of this experiment
are depicted in Figure 2. These results show, on each dataset,
the number of users for whom at least one of the attacks
was able to disclose their identities. From these results, we
can see that on all the datasets, there are several users, from
19% to 88% that are not protected in front of re-identification
attacks despite the use of single LPPMs.
The question that a data security expert may ask in this
situation is what should be done with these vulnerable por-
tions of the respective datasets?. A safe answer would be to
delete these parts of the datasets in order to prevent eventual
user re-identifications that an attacker may perform on the
published data. However, this may generate a massive data
loss that ranges from 13% to 95% of the overall datasets, as
depicted in Figure 3.
A closer look to the protected datasets shows that LPPMs
perform differently from one user to another. Hence, a sec-
ond step considered was to move to a user-centric approach
where the hybridLPPM proposed in [22], is applied to each
user of the considered datasets. The latter selects an LPPM
among a set of LPPMs that resists to re-identification attacks
(if any) with the best utility metric, i.e, a spatial-temporal dis-
tortion is computed [23]. Column HybridLPPM of Figure 2
shows the ratio of non-protected users on the four datasets
for which the best LPPM was chosen (i.e., an LPPM that pro-
tects against all the three considered attacks with the lowest
spatio-temporal distortion). This result shows that despite
the use of an hybrid LPPM for protecting mobility datasets,
there is still a large portion of users that are vulnerable to
re-identification attacks, i.e. 5% to 36%. Consequently, the
generated data loss, as depicted in Figure 3 and that varies
between 5% and 42% on the four datasets is still high.
The objective of this paper is thus to design a novelmethod-
ology that combines off-the-shelf LPPMs to protect a given
mobility dataset in front of a set of user re-identification
attacks while minimizing the eventual data loss. In this way,
we protect the crowd as has been done in the literature and
in addition provide other tools to protect orphan users.
3 MooD Design Principles
In this section, we present MooD (MObility Data Privacy
as Orphan Disease), a system that aims at protecting users
that are not protected against re-identification attacks when
using a single LPPM. In the following, we start by describing
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Figure 4. Fine Grained Protection
the system model. Then, we present an overview of MooD
followed by a description of its components.
3.1 System Model
Let U = {U1,U2, ...,UN } be the set of users in the system.
Each user is represented by two mobility traces, Tui the one
she wants to share and Hui a past mobility trace used to
control the risk of user re-identification.
Definition of a Composition of LPPMs:
A composition of p ∈ N protection mechanisms {Li1,Li2,
. . . ,Lip } a subset of all available LPPMs in L noted Cp (Lik )
is the application of p LPPMs sequentially and gradually
on a mobility trace. As described in Equation 3, it means
that we start by applying the first LPPM Li1 . The resulting
data is used as an entry for the second LPPM Li2 and so on.
The order of the LPPMs is important since it is similar to a
composition of functions1.
Cp (Lik )(T ) = Lip ◦ Lip−1 ◦ . . . ◦ Li2 ◦ Li1 (T )
= Lip (Lip−1 (...Li1 (T ))) (3)
From a set L of LPPMs, the set of all possible composition
is noted C with |C| = ∑ni=1 n!(n−i )! where n = |L|
Definition of a Fine-Grained Protection : The fine-grained
protection splits the mobility trace into multiple sub-traces
and protects each sub-trace independently with different
LPPMs (from L or C) as illustrated in figure 4. The objec-
tive of splitting traces is to separate descriminative mobility
patterns. To this end, several techniques can be used, e.g.,
splitting traces according to time, distance or inter-POIs.
Definition of an Orphan User: A userU is an orphan user
with respect to a set of LPPMs L, a set of re-identification
attack A and a background knowledge H, if she satisfies the
property described:
∀Lj ∈ L, ∃Ak ∈ A,Ak (Lj (TU ),H) = U (4)
Definition of a ProtectedUserwith Single-LPPM: Auser
U is said to be protected by a single-LPPM if she satisfies the
property: which states that there exists at least one LPPM in
the set of considered LPPMs L that makes all the considered
attacks in A fail at re-identifying the user.
∃Lj ∈ L,∀Ak ∈ A,Ak (Lj (TU )) ̸= U (5)
1 To simplify the notations we omit the parameters of each LPPM and
past mobility used of each attack.
Definition of Protected User with Multi-LPPM: A user
U is said to be protected by multi-LPPM if she satisfies the
property:
∃Cj ∈ C,∀Ak ∈ A,Ak (Cj (TU )) ̸= U (6)
Definition of Data Loss: we define the data loss over a
datasetD = {T1,T2, . . . ,TN }, with the set of LPPMs Λ against
the set of re-identification attacks A as the ratio of data size
(counted by records) of non-protected mobility traces in D.
In other words, it is the amount of data remaining after every
non-protected mobility trace of the dataset has been erased
to avoid user re-identification. As described in Equation 7
(with |D|r computes the number of records in D).
data_loss(D,Λ,A) = |DNP |r|D|r
DNP = {T ∈ D | ∀L ∈ Λ, ∃A ∈ A,A(L(TU )) = U }
(7)
3.2 Overview of MooD
MooD is a fine-grained multi-LPPM user-centric approach.
Its main objective is to protect the mobility trace of all users
and in particular orphan users who are not protected by
any single LPPM. The architecture of MooD is depicted
in Figure 5 and its behaviour is described in Algorithm 1.
MooD takes as inputs: the mobility trace of a user, denoted
T , a set of LPPMs denoted L of cardinality n, a set of user
re-identification attacks denoted A of cardinalitym and a
utility metricM. It returns obfuscated mobility data as an en-
tire mobility traceT ′ or as multiple sub-traces {T ′1 ,T ′2 , . . .}. It
has three main components, the first componentMulti-LPPM
Composition Search aims at finding a multi-LPPM composi-
tion for orphan users, i.e. users who are not protected by a
single LPPM against re-identification attacks. The second
component Fine-Grained data protection manages mobility
traces for which the first component was not able to find
a protecting composition of LPPMs and uses fine-grained
protection. In this case, the latter splits the original trace
into a set of sub-traces and sends each one back to the first
component as depicted in Figure 5. Finally, in the last compo-
nent Best LPPM Selection, only the protected mobility trace
(i.e. using single-LPPM or multi-LPPM protection) against
all the attacks with the best utility value is retained.
3.3 Multi-LPPM Composition Search
The Multi-LPPM Composition Search is the main compo-
nent in our system. It takes as input the mobility trace of
a user T , the set of LPPMs L and the set of all considered
re-identification attacks A. First (lines 4- 12), we start by
applying LPPMs independently to search if there exists an
LPPM that can protect the mobility trace.
Then (lines 15- 23), we apply all possible combinations
of the considered LPPMs in an incremental and exhaustive
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Figure 5.MooD Architecture
manner so that the output mobility trace of the current LPPM
becomes the input mobility trace of the next LPPM. For
n = |L|= 3, the number of different compositions is |C = 15|
(given by the expression 3). After that, once a mobility trace
T is transformed by each composition of LPPMs separately,
all the re-identification attacks { Ak }i=1..m are launched in
order to evaluate the resilience of each composition of LPPMs
and keep only ones that prevent from re-identification (if
any).
If all re-identification attacks fail in re-associating the
obfuscated mobility trace T ′ to its originating user, the pri-
vacy protection process is done and the user’s mobility trace
is protected by MooD. In this case, the Best LPPM Selec-
tion component chooses the best LPPM composition based
on a utility metric (section 3.5). However, if at least one
re-identification attack succeeds, it means that the user is
still vulnerable. In this case, the mobility trace of the user is
undertaken by the next component.
3.4 Fine-Grained Data Protection
The Fine-Grained Data Protection is a complementary com-
ponent in our system (line 28- 34). It is launched when the
user’s mobility trace is protected by neither a single LPPM
nor a composition of LPPMs. The idea we adopt is to split the
original trace into a set of sub-traces and try to protect each
sub-trace separately. For that purpose, several techniques
can be used or combined for splitting the original trace such
as the fixed time slices where we split the trace after a fixed
time duration (e.g. every hour) or the fixed distance slices (e.g.
every 1 km). In our work, we opt for the fixed time slice. The
assumption behind going towards fine-grained protection
is that short mobility traces may contain less discriminative
information than larger ones. Therefore, re-identification at-
tacks which are based on profiling user mobility will be less
successful at re-identifying users because the discriminative
mobility patterns collected from the mobility trace of the
user are separated. This way, a user can still participate in
the published dataset or in the crowd-sensing campaign but
only with multiple protected sub-traces that seem to come
from different users. In practice,MooD cuts the trace in half
according to time and recursively calls for MooD (line 32)
with new user IDs (line 34). When the length of a mobility
trace is shorter than δ , the protection process for this trace is
stopped and the corresponding mobility records are erased
from the published dataset or not sent to the crowdsensing
server. The main role of the parameter δ is to stop the recur-
sive split of traces. Moreover, in real use cases, the value of δ
can be chosen according to the type of analysis the data will
go through. For instance, for traffic congestion analysis (or
count queries in general) there is no particular limit since
the length of each sub-trace is not important to count the
presence of users in particular places. But, if the application
needs to study human mobility habits, a more reasonable
value of δ is likely to be more than 24 hours.
3.5 Best LPPM Selection
It is important to protect data while maintaining high util-
ity of the resulting trace. For that pupose, the Best LPPM
Selection component was added to MOOD. Its main role is
to choose T ′, a protected version of a mobility trace with
one among all the resilient LPPMs or multi-LPPMs against
re-identification attacks, while retaining a high value of util-
ity. To this end, a utility metricM is considered. Basically,
a utility metric measures the distortion of obfuscated data
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Algorithm 1 MooD algorithm.
1: functionMood(TU ,A,L,C,M,δ )
2: distortion ←∞
3: out ← ∅
4: for Lj in L do ▷ Single-LPPM protection
5: T ′ ← Lj (TU )
6: k ← 1
7: limit ← |A|
8: while Ak (T ′) ̸= U and k ⩽ limit do
9: k ← k + 1
10: end while
11: if k > limit then out ← out ∪ {T ′}
12: end for
13: if out ̸= ∅ then
14: return {arg min
T ′∈out
(STD(TU ,T ′))[0]}
15: else ▷ Composition of multi-LPPMs
16: for Cj in C − L do
17: T ′ ← Cj (T )
18: k ← 1
19: while Ak (T ′) ̸= U & k ⩽ limit do
20: k ← k + 1
21: end while
22: if k > limit then out ← out ∪ {T ′}
23: end for
24: end if
25: if out ̸= ∅ then
26: return {arg max
T ′∈out
(M(TU ,T ′))[0]}
27: else if lenдth(TU ) ≥ δ then
28: S ← Split_in_hal f (TU )
29: ▷ Fine-Grained protection
30: out ← ∅
31: for Ti in S do
32: out ← out ∪Mood(Ti ,A,L,C, δ )
33: end for
34: return renew_Ids(out )
35: else
36: return ∅
37: end if
38: end function
in comparison with the original data. The lower the distor-
tion the better the quality of the resulting data. In our paper,
we measured the utility using the Spatial-Temporal Distor-
tion metric (STD) [23]. As defined in Equation 8, the spatio-
temporal distortion STD is the average distance between
each record of T ′ and its temporal projection into T . The
temporal projection of the record x = (latx , lonx , tx ) in T ′ is
the expected position re inT at time t . Specifically, we search
for ri = (lati , loni , ti ) and ri+1 = (lat i+1, loni+1, ti+1) in T such
as ti ≤ tx ≤ ti+1, then we compute re the interpolation with
the ratio (tx − ti )/(ti+1 − ti ).
STD(T ,T ′) = 1|T ′ |
∑
x ∈T ′
dtemporal_project ion (x,T ) (8)
4 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the effect of MooD on the pro-
tection against re-identification attacks. In Section 4.1, we
present the experimental setup and the configuration of the
considered LPPMs and attacks. To better understand the im-
pact of the composition of LPPMs and the fine-grained pro-
tection in the protection of orphan users, we evaluate these
parts separately. Specifically, we evaluateMooD’s composi-
tion effect against single and multiple attacks in Sections 4.3
& 4.4. Then, for the remaining unprotected users, we analyze
the effect of MooD’s fine-grained protection in Section 4.5.
4.1 Experimental Setup
All the experiments were carried out in a computer running
an Ubuntu 16.04 LTS OS with 5GB of RAM and 3 cores of
1.8Ghz each. The different considered LPPMs and attacks
were taken from an open-source library [26] or the authors’
own source code.
4.1.1 User Re-identification Attack Configuration
The three chosen re-identification attacks in this paper are:
AP-attack, POI-attack, and PIT-attack described below.
POI-Attack is introduced in [27] by Primault and others,
where Points Of Interest (POIs for short) are used to rep-
resent the user’s mobility profile. In the training phase, a
clustering algorithm [36] is run on raw mobility traces to
extract POIs and build each user’s mobility profile. After
that, in the re-identification phase, when an adversary entity
receives an anonymous mobility trace T ′x , the attack builds
its mobility profile. Then, it measures the similarity between
the anonymous mobility profile and all the known mobility
profiles previously built. The similarity is based on the geo-
graphical distance between POIs. Finally, only the mobility
profile which minimizes the distance is selected.
PIT-Attack is introduced in [16] by Gambs et al., where
the Mobility Markov Chain (MMC) model is used to describe
users’ mobility behaviours. The states are POIs ordered by
the number of records inside them and the edges represent
the probability of transition between each pair of POIs. In
the training phase, the MMC model of each individual is
built based on the previously recorded mobility data. After
that, in the re-identification phase, when the attacker has at
his disposal an anonymous mobility trace, it constructs its
MMC model and measures the distance between the latter
and the background knowledge. Two information are con-
sidered: the geographical distance between POIs based on
Euclidian distance and the weight of POIs. The weight of a
POI is computed using the proportion of points contained
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inside a given POI. The authors of this article proposed many
distance metrics to compare MMCs, the most effective one
is stats-prox distance, a combination of two distances: the
stationary distance and the proximity distance [16]. Finally,
the MMC model which minimizes the stats-prox distance
with the anonymous MMC is selected.
AP-Attack is introduced in [22] by Maouche and al, where
the concept of heatmaps is used to describe the mobility user
profile. To this end, a map is divided into several cells of
equal size. The frequency of a visited cell is defined by the
number of user’s records inside the cell. In this way, it is
easy to distinguish between extremely to poorly frequented
regions by individuals. To measure the distance between
an anonymous profile and the profile of known users, the
Topsoe Divergence metric is used [13].
The attacks are parameterized as follows: AP-attack has a
cell size parameter fixed at 800 meters which is the default
value in [22]. POI -attack and PIT -attack require a diameter
of the clustering area to extract points of interest (POIs),
and a duration of time spent at a POI. These values were
respectively set to 200 meters and 1 hour as done in [22].
4.1.2 LPPM Configuration
To evaluate MooD, we select three representative LPPMs:
(1) Geo-I [4], (2) Trilateration [18] (TRL) and (3) HMC [23].
Each LPPM belongs to a class of protection methods. We
chose (1) Geo-I, which belongs to data perturbation based
mechanisms. It obfuscates mobility traces by adding a lapla-
cian noise to each record of the mobility trace. (2) TRL based
mechanism is a different way to generate dummies in online
services. It is based on trilateration: when a user launches
an LSS (i.e. Location Searching Service) query, looking for a
restaurant or a gas station, the algorithm chooses randomly
3 assisted locations l1, l2 and l3 in a range of r from the real
location l of the user. The service provider looks for nearby
places according to the three assisted locations and sends
the result to the user. Finally, the user gets an accurate result
by intersecting the result of the three sent locations using
trilateration. (3) Heat Map Confusion (HMC) is a combina-
tion of data perturbation technique and dummies generation.
In HMC, the mobility trace of each user is represented as
a heatmap. Then, the algorithm alters the given heatmap
by making it look similar to the one of another user. The
objective of such an approach is to preserve a certain level of
data utility and confuse an attacker that tries to re-identify
users’mobility traces. Finally, HMC transforms back each
obfuscated heatmap into a set of mobility traces.
Each LPPM has its own configuration parameters. These
parameters have an impact on the balance between privacy
and data utility. In these experiments, we chose medium
values of parameters because the objective of our study is
not to find the best configuration as previous works focused
on ([9], [25]) but to show that it is possible with a reasonable
configuration and a relevant combination of LPPMs to reach
an adequate trade-off between privacy and utility. Specifi-
cally, Geo-I has ε as a privacy parameter, which tunes the
amount of noise added to the mobility data, (the lower the
epsilon the higher the protection). We have fixed the value
of this parameter to 0, 01 which corresponds to a medium
privacy level. TRL has a radius r from the real user’s position
where the fake locations are generated. The latter was set
to 1 km. Finally, as HMC is based on heatmaps, the cell size
of the heatmap is a parameter of this technique and it was
set to 800 meters which concords with the used value in the
original paper [23].
Moreover, we compared our solution to the HybridLPPM
algorithm proposed in [22] with slight variations. Briefly, we
selected the aforementioned LPPMswith the same parameter
values. Then, we ordered them according to the degree of
data distortion they generate after obfuscation: (HMC →
Geo-I→ TRL). Finally, we opt for the LPPM which degrades
the least the user’s mobility data while protecting it, based
on the defined order.
4.2 Mobility Datasets
In our experiments, we used four real mobility datasets
with a summary depicted on table 1. These datasets are :
(1) MDC [19] that contains the mobility of users in the city
of Geneva; (2) Privamov [8] that contains the mobility of
users in the city of Lyon; (3) Cabspotting [24] that contains
the mobility of cab drivers in the city of San Francisco and
(4) Geolife [34] that contains the mobility of users in the city
of Beijing.
In our experiments, we considered the 30 most active suc-
cessive days of each dataset. After that, we split the mobility
trace of each user chronologically into a period of 15 days
used as a training set (i.e. background knowledge) and the
remaining 15 days used as a testing set. Only active users
during those periods were considered.
In the experiments we conducted, a mobility trace that is
still re-identified after the multi-LPPM composition search
is split into sub-traces of 24 hours period before applying
the recursive splitting algorithm presented previously. We
choose chunks of 24 hours to simulate the scenario of a
crowdsensing application where users send their data daily.
Besides, we set the value of δ to 4 hours inMooD’ algorithm.
Table 1. Description of datasets
Name Cabspotting Geolife MDC PrivaMov
# users 531 41 141 41
location San Francisco Beijing Geneva Lyon
# records 11 179 014 1 468 989 904 282 948 965
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Figure 6. Resilience to one attack –MooD vs. competitors
4.3 Resilience of MooD’s Multi-LPPM Composition
to a Single Re-identification Attack
As a first step, we want to showcase the problem of orphan
users when a single attack is used by the data analyst. We
consider a set of state-of-the-art LPPMs (n = 3) and we select
AP-attack as - the most powerful attack currently known
in the literature - in order to evaluate the robustness of the
generated obfuscated data against a re-identification attack.
We compared the result of MooD with the existing LPPMs
applied as single LPPMs on the four datasets.
The results depicted in Figure 6, show that in the MDC
dataset, 96 out of 141 users are re-identified when no LPPM
is applied, which means that 45 users are naturally insen-
sitive to AP-attack. Additionally, 95, 79 and 14 users are
re-identified while applying Geo-I, TRL, and HMC respec-
tively. Whereas these numbers are lower (i.e 10 users) when
HybridLPPM is used. All of those users are protected when
using MooD. In the PrivaMov dataset, 32 out of 41 users are
exposed to re-identification threat. 31, 26 and 9 users are re-
identified when Geo-I, TRL and HMC are applied as a single
LPPM respectively.Whereas in the case of HybridLPPM, only
4 users remain unprotected, Similarly, in the Geolife dataset,
32 out of 41 users identities are revealed when no LPPM is
applied and AP-Attack is launched. Then 4 users are still
non-protected by neither a single LPPM nor a HybridLPPM,
whereas withMooD’composition of LPPMs, only one user
is still vulnerable against AP-attack. Finally, in the Cabspot-
ting, nearly half of the dataset is naturally protected against
AP-Attack (242 out of 536), this is due to the homogeneity of
cab drivers moving patterns. After applying a single LPPM,
almost all the remaining unprotected users became protected
except 4 users, for which the application of MooD with its
multi-LPPM composition succeeds in protecting them.
4.4 Resilience of MooD’s Multi-LPPM Composition
to Multiple Re-identification Attacks
In this experiment, we use MooD with a stronger virtual
attacker. It uses multiple re-identification attacks (m = 3) to
assess whether the protected users are uncovered by at least
one of the attacks. This is possible because MooD knows
the ground truth about the real identity of the users. The
corresponding results, as shown in Figure 7a, in the MDC
dataset, 107 out of 141 users are re-identified when no LPPM
is applied. This means that 34 users are naturally protected
without the application of LPPMs. Thereafter, 107, 86 and 65
users are non-protected against at least one-attack among
the considered ones when Geo-I, TRL and HMC are applied
respectively. Then, 51 out of 141 users are still re-identified
when HybridLPPM is applied to mobility traces. Whereas
only 3 users remain non-protected with the Multi-LPPM
combination Search of MooD. In the PrivaMov Dataset, as
depicted in Figure 7b, 37 out of 41 users are vulnerable against
re-identification attacks when no LPPM is used to protect
data. Then, 36 users are re-identified when Geo-I mecha-
nism is applied with medium privacy. The latter is not robust
against re-identification attacks. The only way to make it
resilient to the considered attacks is to increase its level of
privacy (i.e. reduce the value of ϵ) at the expense of data qual-
ity. Moreover, 29 and 20 users are non-protected when TRL
and HMC are applied, respectively. Whereas these numbers
decrease to 10 users when the HybridLPPM is considered.
Finally, only 3 users remain non-protected while the multi-
LPPM composition inMooD is used. Similarly, in the Geolife
dataset, as shown in Figure 7c, 32 users out of 41 users are un-
protected against at least one among all the attacks. Then, the
number of re-identified users decreases slightly to 28, 23 and
15 users when Geo-I, TRL and HMC are applied separately.
Furthermore, the application of HybridLPPM generated 10
unprotected users and finally, only 2 users are still vulnera-
ble against one or more re-identification attacks. Finally, in
Cabspotting dataset, as illustrated in Figure7d, more than
half of the whole users are re-identified in case of no LPPM.
After that, when Geo-I, HMC, and TRL are applied as a Single
LPPM, 263, 131 and 65 users are re-identified respectively.
Then, the number of re-identified users declines to 27 users
with HybridLPPM. Lastly, while considering the multi-LPPM
composition of MooD, no users left unprotected. It means
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Figure 7. Resilience to multiple attacks –MooD vs. competitors
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Figure 8. Fine-grained protection withMooD
that we can protect the whole dataset from all the considered
attacks.
4.5 Evaluation of Fine-Grained Data Protection
As few users remain vulnerable to re-identification attacks,
we zoom on this category of users and apply the fine-grained
data protection. We start by splitting their mobility traces
into multiple sub-traces of 24 h period (as explained in sec-
tion 3.4). Then, each sub-trace feeds MooD’s multi-LPPM
composition component in order to protect each sub-trace
independently.
In the MDC Dataset, three users are not protected with
the composition of LPPMs, denoted {A,B,C}. We split their
mobility traces into 24 h sub-traces. Then, we applyMooD
on the resulting sub-traces. Figure 8 shows that there are
68% of protected sub-traces with MooD and 32% of sub-
traces remain unprotected with the multi-LPPM composi-
tion. Therefore, we can see that user A became protected.
User B almost protected (92% of his sub-traces are protected),
whereas User C is still non-protected (only 11% of his sub-
traces are protected). Thus, the granularity of the considered
traces has an impact on privacy protection. With the pri-
vamov dataset, three users were left non protected when
only the multi-LPPM composition is used, denoted {D, E, F }.
Similarly, we split their mobility traces into sub-traces of
24 h period. Then, we apply MooD’s multi-LPPM compo-
sition on each sub-trace. The results show that 67% of the
sub-traces of user D are protected with MooD, 43% of the
sub-traces of user E are protected withMooD and 50% of the
sub-traces of user F are protected byMooD too. Therefore,
almost the sub-traces are partially protected. Finally, on the
geolife dataset, only two users {G,H } were not protected
byMooD’s multi-LPPM composition. Then, after splitting
their mobility traces, we obtain 4 sub-traces (i.e. 2 sub-traces
for each user), the results show that only one sub-trace is
protected byMooD.
4.6 Impact of MooD on Data Utility and Data Loss
It is important to evaluate the effectiveness of MooD in terms
of data utility and data loss. In this paper, as discussed in Sec-
tion 3.5, data utility is measured using the spatio-temporal
distortion metric [23] (see Section 3.5) and the data loss
is computed as defined in Section 3.1 After that, we com-
pareMooD to state-of-the art LPPMs, previously described
(see Section 4.1.2) by considering four different limits of
the spatial-temporal distortion: low (i.e. < 500m), medium
(i.e. < 1000m), high (i.e. < 5000m) and extremely high (i.e. ⩾
5000m). Over all the datasets, as depicted in Figure 9, the
result shows that for all the protected users (i.e. 754 users in
the four datasets), 53.47% have a high utility usingMooD (i.e.
< 500m) compared its competitors, i.e. 38%, 12%, 45% and 49%
with Geo-I, TRL, HMC and HybridLPPM, respectively. More-
over, with medium utility (i.e. < 1000m), MooD outperforms
its competitors with a ratio of 78% as to Geo-I, TRL, HMC
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Figure 10. Ratio of Data LossMooD vs. Competitors.
and HybridLPPM with 38%, 70%, 48% and 74%. This means
thatMooD can provide a good balance between privacy and
data utility compared to its competitors.
Depending on the degree of the distorted data, we can
imagine several scenarios of data publishing and crowd-
sensing applications using our system. For instance, measur-
ing the level of noise in a city when the distortion is low, like
for instance [21] where users participate with their mobile
phones equipped with a GPS chip to measure the amount
of noise in their vicinity. For medium distortion, our sys-
tem can be used in an application that measures the level of
pollution in a specific area. Finally, for high distortion, an
application could be related to weather forecasting where
the spatial precision of the protected data is not sensitive as
in the previous scenarios.
In addition, we compared the data loss generated byMooD
and the state of the art LPPMs. We found that a data loss
between 14% and 95% is caused by the application of a sin-
gle LPPM (i.e. Geo-I, TRL and HMC). Furthermore, when
HybridLPPM is used the generated data loss is in a range
between 5% and 42%. Whereas with MooD, a data loss be-
tween 0% and 2.5% is generated which is a negligible amount
of data compared to its competitors.
5 Related Work
Several directions of investigation were taken by researchers
tomitigate location privacy threats. Various Location Privacy
Protection Mechanisms have been proposed [17], [7], [30],
[5]. Some of them rely on formal privacy guarantees such
as k-anonymity [31] or differential privacy [12], some of
them target sensitive information and try to hide them (e.g.,
POIs. . . ) [28] and some of them aim at neutralizing specific
attacks or preserving specific applications.
NeverWalkAlone [1] and its extension W4M (Wait for
Me) [2] are examples of LPPMs which enforce k-anonymity.
They guarantee that at each instant, there are at least k users
walking inside a cylindrical volume. Another way of achiev-
ing k-anonymity is to generate fake data called dummies in
order to make the real location of a target user unrecognized.
For instance, Trilateration (TRL) [18] randomly chooses 3
assisted locations l1, l2 and l3 in a range of r from the real
location l of the user and send them to the service provider
instead of the real position l . The latter is mainly used in LSS
services (Location searching services) where trilateration is
used to get the exact distance between the user’s location
and the requested places from each assisted location, which
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makes this LPPM particularly suited for this type of appli-
cations. As for differential privacy, Geo-indistinguishability
(Geo-I) introduced by Andres et al. in [4] applies it in the
context of location privacy. It bounds the probability of two
points to be reported positions of the same real position
within a given radius r . Thus, a user can quantify the level
of privacy according to their preferences using a privacy pa-
rameter ϵ (the lower the ϵ , the higher the privacy level). The
authors suggested a way to achieve ϵ-Geo-I in practice by
adding Laplacian spatial noise to each GPS coordinate. Addi-
tionally, the same authors proposed an extension of ϵ-Geo-I
in [10], where contextual information about users’ environ-
ments are used to calibrate the amount of noise applied on
mobility data. Moreover, HeatMap Confusion (HMC) [23],
which uses a combination of data perturbation and dummies
generation, is an LPPM that is designed to counter particu-
lar type of attacks, i.e. re-identification attacks. In the latter,
the entire mobility of a user is represented in the form of
a heatmap. Each user heatmap is altered so that it looks
similar to the one of another user. The heatmap is finally
transformed back to a mobility trace using traces of multiple
users.
Furthermore, Some authors found that the application of
the same LPPM on a whole dataset is not fair regarding the
location privacy of users. Some may be overprotected, in
the sense that the data utility is decreased further than it
is needed and others may remain unprotected [22]. This is
why, some works proposed a user-centric approach where
each individual is protected according to his mobility trace,
his characteristics and his preferences in term of privacy and
utility. For example, SmartMask [20] is an example designed
to automatically learn users’ privacy preferences under dif-
ferent contexts (e.g. location semantic, frequency of visits,
duration of visiting a location, time period). Once the privacy
level is determined, different techniques ranging from sim-
ple operations of obfuscation to cloaking strategies are used
depending on the required privacy level. LP-guardian is also
a user-centric solution [14] implemented on Android users’
smartphones where a decision tree is used to choose the
adequate action to perform against different threats. These
works are closed toMooD but it was not possible to compare
with them because they require richer datasets and not only
timestamped mobility traces.
Finally, another possible direction is to play on the config-
uration of LPPMs in order to protect the users’ mobility data.
Thus, instead of considering an LPPM with the same config-
uration, the idea is to tailor the LPPM configuration for each
user according to his behavior over the time. To this end,
some authors exploited optimization algorithms to find the
best configuration for a given LPPM which ensure the trade-
off between privacy and data utility objectives. For instance,
ALP (Adaptive Location Privacy) [25] a framework which
enables an automatic configuration of the LPPM parameters
using simulated annealing. Also, PULP [9] is another system
which automatically configures LPPMs according to users’
objectives in term of privacy and utility. MooD is comple-
mentary to those configuration frameworks. In other words,
instead of setting LPPMs with a default configuration of
parameters, we can integrate one of those framework to pro-
vide a tailored configuration for each LPPM or Multi-LPPM
according to each user in our system.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we presentedMooD a user-centric fine-grained
protection system based on the composition of multiple
LPPMs. Its main objective is to protect theminority of orphan
users who are not protected by any single LPPM and thus
reducing the data loss in a published dataset or in a crowd-
sensing campaign. The experiments conducted on four real
mobility datasets show that the proposed system is resilient
to multiple re-identification attacks and can achieve a high
level of privacy protection while maintaining a high utility
level.
However, asMooD is based on brute force search for multi-
LPPM composition, it is a time-consuming approach. That is
why we aim in our future work at optimizing the search by
exploring new heuristics and advanced ML techniques.
Furthermore, MooD can be extended by using state-of-
the-art LPPMs, attacks and utility metrics. As future work,
since the amount of mobility data is continuously growing,
the training set of the re-identification attacks can be period-
ically updated, in order to better feed our system and have a
dynamic protection that evolves with the possible evolutions
of the user behaviour. Another open direction is to test more
sophisticated techniques for the fine-grained data protection
component. For instance, a mobility trace can be split by
inter-POIs or according to time gaps in mobility traces.
Acknowledgments
This work benefited from the support of the French Na-
tional ResearchAgency (ANR), through the SIBIL-Lab project
(ANR-17-LCV2-0014), and the PRIMaTE project (ANR-17-
CE25-0017).
References
[1] Osman Abul, Francesco Bonchi, and Mirco Nanni. 2008. Never Walk
Alone: Uncertainty for Anonymity in Moving Objects Databases. In
Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Data Engineering,
ICDE 2008, April 7-12, 2008, Cancún, Mexico. 376–385. https://doi.org/
10.1109/ICDE.2008.4497446
[2] Osman Abul, Francesco Bonchi, and Mirco Nanni. 2010. Anonymiza-
tion of moving objects databases by clustering and perturbation. Inf.
Syst. 35, 8 (2010), 884–910. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.is.2010.05.003
[3] Berker Agir, Kévin Huguenin, Urs Hengartner, and Jean-Pierre Hubaux.
2016. On the Privacy Implications of Location Semantics. PoPETs 2016,
4 (2016), 165–183. https://doi.org/10.1515/popets-2016-0034
Middleware ’19, December 8–13, 2019, Davis, CA, USA Khalfoun et al.
[4] Miguel E. Andrés, Nicolás Emilio Bordenabe, Konstantinos Chatzikoko-
lakis, and Catuscia Palamidessi. 2013. Geo-indistinguishability: differ-
ential privacy for location-based systems. In 2013 ACM SIGSAC Con-
ference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS’13, Berlin, Ger-
many, November 4-8, 2013. 901–914. https://doi.org/10.1145/2508859.
2516735
[5] Omer Barak, Gabriella Cohen, and Eran Toch. 2016. Anonymizing
mobility data using semantic cloaking. Pervasive andMobile Computing
28 (2016), 102–112. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pmcj.2015.10.013
[6] Igor Bilogrevic, Kévin Huguenin, Murtuza Jadliwala, Florent Lopez,
Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Philip Ginzboorg, and Valtteri Niemi. 2013. In-
ferring social ties in academic networks using short-range wireless
communications. In Proceedings of the 12th ACMworkshop onWorkshop
on privacy in the electronic society. ACM, 179–188.
[7] Igor Bilogrevic, Kévin Huguenin, StefanMihaila, Reza Shokri, and Jean-
Pierre Hubaux. 2015. Predicting Users’ Motivations behind Location
Check-Ins and Utility Implications of Privacy Protection Mechanisms.
In 22nd Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium,
NDSS 2015, San Diego, California, USA, February 8-11, 2015. https:
//doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2015.23032
[8] Antoine Boutet, Sonia Ben Mokhtar, and Vincent Primault. 2016.
Uniqueness Assessment of Human Mobility on Multi-Sensor Datasets.
Ph.D. Dissertation. LIRIS UMR CNRS 5205.
[9] Sophie Cerf, Vincent Primault, Antoine Boutet, Sonia Ben Mokhtar,
Robert Birke, Sara Bouchenak, Lydia Y. Chen, Nicolas Marchand, and
Bogdan Robu. 2017. PULP: Achieving Privacy and Utility Trade-Off in
User Mobility Data. In 36th IEEE Symposium on Reliable Distributed
Systems, SRDS 2017, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, September 26-29, 2017.
164–173. https://doi.org/10.1109/SRDS.2017.25
[10] Konstantinos Chatzikokolakis, Catuscia Palamidessi, and Marco
Stronati. 2015. Constructing elastic distinguishability met-
rics for location privacy. PoPETs 2015, 2 (2015), 156–170.
http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/popets.2015.2015.issue-2/
popets-2015-0023/popets-2015-0023.xml
[11] Yoni De Mulder, George Danezis, Lejla Batina, and Bart Preneel. 2008.
Identification via location-profiling in GSM networks. In Proceedings
of the 7th ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society. ACM,
23–32.
[12] Cynthia Dwork. 2011. Differential privacy. Encyclopedia of Cryptogra-
phy and Security (2011), 338–340.
[13] Dominik Maria Endres and Johannes E Schindelin. 2003. A new metric
for probability distributions. IEEE Transactions on Information theory
(2003).
[14] Kassem Fawaz and Kang G. Shin. 2014. Location Privacy Protection
for Smartphone Users. In Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Confer-
ence on Computer and Communications Security, Scottsdale, AZ, USA,
November 3-7, 2014. 239–250. https://doi.org/10.1145/2660267.2660270
[15] Sébastien Gambs, Marc-Olivier Killijian, and Miguel Núñez del
Prado Cortez. 2012. Next place prediction using mobility markov
chains. In Proceedings of the First Workshop on Measurement, Privacy,
and Mobility. ACM, 3.
[16] Sébastien Gambs, Marc-Olivier Killijian, and Miguel Núñez del
Prado Cortez. 2014. De-anonymization attack on geolocated data.
J. Comput. System Sci. 80, 8 (2014), 1597–1614.
[17] Ruchika Gupta and Udai Pratap Rao. 2017. An Exploration to Loca-
tion Based Service and Its Privacy Preserving Techniques: A Survey.
Wireless Personal Communications 96, 2 (2017), 1973–2007. https:
//doi.org/10.1007/s11277-017-4284-2
[18] Yan Huang, Zhipeng Cai, and Anu G. Bourgeois. 2018. Search locations
safely and accurately: A location privacy protection algorithm with
accurate service. J. Network and Computer Applications 103 (2018),
146–156. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jnca.2017.12.002
[19] J K Laurila, Daniel Gatica-Perez, I Aad, Blom J., Olivier Bornet, Trinh-
Minh-Tri Do, O Dousse, J Eberle, and M Miettinen. 2012. The Mobile
Data Challenge: Big Data for Mobile Computing Research. In Pervasive
Computing.
[20] Huaxin Li, Haojin Zhu, Suguo Du, Xiaohui Liang, and Xuemin Sher-
man Shen. 2018. Privacy leakage of location sharing in mobile social
networks: Attacks and defense. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and
Secure Computing 15, 4 (2018), 646–660.
[21] Nicolas Maisonneuve, Matthias Stevens, Maria E. Niessen, and Luc
Steels. 2009. NoiseTube: Measuring and mapping noise pollution
with mobile phones. In Information Technologies in Environmental
Engineering, Proceedings of the 4th International ICSC Symposium, ITEE
2009, Thessaloniki, Greece, May 28-29, 2009. 215–228. https://doi.org/
10.1007/978-3-540-88351-7_16
[22] Mohamed Maouche, Sonia Ben Mokhtar, and Sara Bouchenak. 2017.
AP-Attack: A Novel User Re-identification Attack On Mobility
Datasets. In Proceedings of the 14th EAI International Conference on
Mobile and Ubiquitous Systems: Computing, Networking and Services,
Melbourne, Australia, November 7-10, 2017. 48–57. https://doi.org/10.
1145/3144457.3144494
[23] Mohamed Maouche, Sonia Ben Mokhtar, and Sara Bouchenak. 2018.
HMC. Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and
Ubiquitous Technologies 2, 3 (2018), 1–25.
[24] Michal Piorkowski, Natasa Sarafijanovic-Djukic, and Matthias Gross-
glauser. 2009. CRAWDAD data set epfl/mobility (v. 2009-02-24).
[25] Vincent Primault, Antoine Boutet, Sonia Ben Mokhtar, and Lionel
Brunie. 2016. Adaptive Location Privacy with ALP. In 35th IEEE Sym-
posium on Reliable Distributed Systems, SRDS 2016, Budapest, Hungary,
September 26-29, 2016. 269–278. https://doi.org/10.1109/SRDS.2016.044
[26] Vincent Primault, Mohamed Maouche, Antoine Boutet, Sonia Ben
Mokhtar, Sara Bouchenak, and Lionel Brunie. 2018. ACCIO: How to
Make Location Privacy Experimentation Open and Easy. In 38th IEEE
International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, ICDCS
2018, Vienna, Austria, July 2-6, 2018. 896–906. https://doi.org/10.1109/
ICDCS.2018.00091
[27] Vincent Primault, Sonia Ben Mokhtar, Cédric Lauradoux, and Lionel
Brunie. 2014. Differentially private location privacy in practice. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1410.7744 (2014).
[28] Vincent Primault, Sonia Ben Mokhtar, Cédric Lauradoux, and Lionel
Brunie. 2015. Time Distortion Anonymization for the Publication
of Mobility Data with High Utility. CoRR abs/1507.00443 (2015).
arXiv:1507.00443 http://arxiv.org/abs/1507.00443
[29] Adam Sadilek and John Krumm. 2012. Far Out: Predicting Long-Term
Human Mobility. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth AAAI Conference
on Artificial Intelligence, July 22-26, 2012, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/AAAI/AAAI12/paper/view/4845
[30] Pravin Shankar, Vinod Ganapathy, and Liviu Iftode. 2009. Privately
querying location-based services with SybilQuery. In UbiComp 2009:
Ubiquitous Computing, 11th International Conference, UbiComp 2009,
Orlando, Florida, USA, September 30 - October 3, 2009, Proceedings. 31–40.
https://doi.org/10.1145/1620545.1620550
[31] Latanya Sweeney. 2002. k-anonymity: A model for protecting privacy.
International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based
Systems 10, 05 (2002), 557–570.
[32] Dashun Wang, Dino Pedreschi, Chaoming Song, Fosca Giannotti, and
Albert-Laszlo Barabasi. 2011. Human mobility, social ties, and link
prediction. In Proceedings of the 17th ACM SIGKDD international con-
ference on Knowledge discovery and data mining. Acm, 1100–1108.
[33] RongWang, Min Zhang, Dengguo Feng, Yanyan Fu, and Zhenyu Chen.
2015. A de-anonymization attack on geo-located data considering
spatio-temporal influences. In International Conference on Information
and Communications Security. Springer, 478–484.
[34] Yu Zheng, Xing Xie, Wei-Ying Ma, et al. 2010. Geolife: A collaborative
social networking service among user, location and trajectory. IEEE
Data Eng. Bull. 33, 2 (2010), 32–39.
MooD: MObility Data Privacy as Orphan Disease Middleware ’19, December 8–13, 2019, Davis, CA, USA
[35] Changqing Zhou, Dan Frankowski, Pamela Ludford, Shashi Shekhar,
and Loren Terveen. 2004. Discovering personal gazetteers: an inter-
active clustering approach. In Proceedings of the 12th annual ACM
international workshop on Geographic information systems. ACM, 266–
273.
[36] Changqing Zhou, Dan Frankowski, Pamela J. Ludford, Shashi Shekhar,
and Loren G. Terveen. 2004. Discovering personal gazetteers: an
interactive clustering approach. In 12th ACM International Workshop
on Geographic Information Systems, ACM-GIS 2004, November 12-13,
2004, Washington, DC, USA, Proceedings. 266–273. https://doi.org/10.
1145/1032222.1032261
